The knotty problem of causal inference in observational, quasi-experimental, and experimental designs has captured the attention of scientists, philosophers, and lay-persons for thousands of years. This page will include key references on the definition and identification of causality in non-experimental settings (i.e., observational and quasi-experimental studies). This is a work in progress and will undergo major revisions and extensions in the near future due to the explosion of interest in causal modeling in the social sciences, statistics, and philosophy. Greater attention will be paid to the epistemological value of Structural Equation Models (SEM) and related methods. Readers who would like to contribute additional key references are encouraged to send their suggestions to Niels Waller.
Aristotle believed that "Why" questions could be answered in at least four different ways. These four ways provide the outline for his highly influential "Theory or Four Causes."
Aristotle lays out his Theory of Causes in Physics, Book II, Chapter 3.
Part 3
"Now that we have established these distinctions, we must proceed to consider
causes, their character and number. Knowledge is the object of our inquiry,
and men do not think they know a thing till they have grasped the 'why' of
(which is to grasp its primary cause). So clearly we too must do this as
regards both coming to be and passing away and every kind of physical change,
in order that, knowing their principles, we may try to refer to these
principles each of our problems.
In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and which
persists, is called 'cause', e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of
the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species.
In another sense (2) the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the
essence, and its genera, are called 'causes' (e.g. of the octave the relation
of 2:1, and generally number), and the parts in the definition.
Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g. the
man who gave advice is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and
generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed.
Again (4) in the sense of end or 'that for the sake of which' a thing
is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about. ('Why is he walking
about?' we say. 'To be healthy', and, having said that, we think we have
assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all the intermediate steps
which are brought about through the action of something else as means
towards the end, e.g. reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical
instruments are means towards health. All these things are 'for the sake of'
the end, though they differ from one another in that some are activities,
others instruments.
This then perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term 'cause'
is used.
As the word has several senses, it follows that there are several causes
of the same thing not merely in virtue of a concomitant attribute), e.g.
both the art of the sculptor and the bronze are causes of the statue.
These are causes of the statue qua statue, not in virtue of anything else
that it may be-only not in the same way, the one being the material cause,
the other the cause whence the motion comes. Some things cause each other
reciprocally, e.g. hard work causes fitness and vice versa, but again not
in the same way, but the one as end, the other as the origin of change. Further
the same thing is the cause of contrary results. For that which by its presence
brings about one result is sometimes blamed for bringing about the contrary by
its absence. Thus we ascribe the wreck of a ship to the absence of the pilot
whose presence was the cause of its safety.
All the causes now mentioned fall into four familiar divisions. The letters
are the causes of syllables, the material of artificial products, fire, &c., of
bodies, the parts of the whole, and the premisses of the conclusion, in the sense
of 'that from which'. Of these pairs the one set are causes in the sense of
substratum, e.g. the parts, the other set in the sense of essence-the whole and
the combination and the form. But the seed and the doctor and the adviser, and
generally the maker, are all sources whence the change or stationariness originates,
while the others are causes in the sense of the end or the good of the rest; for
'that for the sake of which' means what is best and the end of the things
that lead up to it. (Whether we say the 'good itself or the 'apparent good'
makes no difference.)
Such then is the number and nature of the kinds of cause.
Now the modes of causation are many, though when brought under heads
they too can be reduced in number. For 'cause' is used in many senses and
even within the same kind one may be prior to another (e.g. the doctor and
the expert are causes of health, the relation 2:1 and number of the octave),
and always what is inclusive to what is particular. Another mode of causation
is the incidental and its genera, e.g. in one way 'Polyclitus', in another
'sculptor' is the cause of a statue, because 'being Polyclitus' and 'sculptor'
are incidentally conjoined. Also the classes in which the incidental attribute
is included; thus 'a man' could be said to be the cause of a statue or, generally,
'a living creature'. An incidental attribute too may be more or less remote,
e.g. suppose that 'a pale man' or 'a musical man' were said to be the cause of
the statue.
All causes, both proper and incidental, may be spoken of either as potential
or as actual; e.g. the cause of a house being built is either 'house-builder'
or 'house-builder building'.
Similar distinctions can be made in the things of which the causes are causes,
e.g. of 'this statue' or of 'statue' or of 'image' generally, of 'this bronze'
or of 'bronze' or of 'material' generally. So too with the incidental attributes.
Again we may use a complex expression for either and say, e.g. neither
'Polyclitus' nor 'sculptor' but 'Polyclitus, sculptor'.
All these various uses, however, come to six in number, under each of which
again the usage is twofold. Cause means either what is particular or a genus,
or an incidental attribute or a genus of that, and these either as a complex or
each by itself; and all six either as actual or as potential. The difference is
this much, that causes which are actually at work and particular exist and cease
to exist simultaneously with their effect, e.g. this healing person with this
being-healed person and that house-building man with that being-built house; but
this is not always true of potential causes--the house and the housebuilder do
not pass away simultaneously.
In investigating the cause of each thing it is always necessary to seek
what is most precise (as also in other things): thus man builds because he is
a builder, and a builder builds in virtue of his art of building. This last cause
then is prior: and so generally.
Further, generic effects should be assigned to generic causes, particular effects
to particular causes, e.g. statue to sculptor, this statue to this sculptor; and
powers are relative to possible effects, actually operating causes to things which
are actually being effected.
This must suffice for our account of the number of causes and the modes of causation."
"This misplacing hath caused a deficiency, or at least a great improficiency in the sciences themselves. For the handling of final causes, mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery."Stated less formally, Bacon believed that Aristotle's emphasis on final causes had impeded the progress of science. Notice what a radical idea this was considering that the Final Cause of most natural phenomena was ascribed to the power or will of God. This view was later emphasized by Baruch Spinoza (1632 - 1677) who said that "All final causes are nothing but human fictions."
The aim is not "to investigate the cause of the acceleration of natural motion, concerning which various opinions have been expressed by various philosophies"; but rather "to investigate and demonstrate some of the properties of accelerated motion."
"We never can, by our utmost scrutiny discover anything but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connect between it and its supposed effect."Full text of: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
"It is easy to see that co-relation must be the consequence of the variations of the two organs beling partly due to common cause."
Beyond such discarded fundamentals as 'matter" and 'force' lies still another amidst the inscrutable arcana of modern science, namely, the category of cause and effect."
"All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of the fundamental axioms or postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in advanced sciences such as gravitational astronomy, the word `cause' never occurs ... The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm."--B. Russell, ``On the Notion of Cause'', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 13 (1913), pp. 1-26.
Russell's views on Causation as set forth in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(1987) "It would be very healthy if more researchers abandon thinking of and using terms such as cause and effect."
"There is scarcely an issue of `Physical Review' that does not contain at least one article using either 'cause' or 'causality' in its title."
This article contains a fascinating account of John Snow's demonstration that cholera was a waterborne infectious disease. Freedman compares Snow's approach to establishing causal relations (i.e., wearing down one's shoe leather) with the modern practice of using regression models on nonexperimental data.
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